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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ROYAL RESOURCES, INC. , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GIBRALTER FINANCIAL CORP. , 
GIBRALTER SECURITIES CORP. , 
(a wholly owned .subsidiary of 
Gibral ter Financial Corp. , ) 
LYNN DIXON, and GEORGE PERRY, 
Defendants-Appellants.: 
No. 15817 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT LYNN DIXON 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Lynn Dixon, appeals from a judgment of the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, 
in favor of the respondent Royal Resources, Inc., in the sum of 
~10,400 on non-jury trial, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The respondent Royal Resources, Inc., plaintiff below, a 
c6rporation, filed suit in the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District on November 24, 1975, against Gibralter Financial Corp., 
Gibralter Securities Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Gibralter 
Financial Corp. , Lynn Dixon and George Perry, seeking damages 
for monies allegedly had by the defendants. On June 17, 1976, 
an amended complaint was duly filed seeking judgment in the sum 
of $10,680 from the same named defendants. (R. 9) An answer 
denying the individual liability of Lynn Dixon and George Perry 
was duly filed. (R. ll) On the 22nd day of July, 1977, judgment 
was entered in favor of Royal Resources, Inc. against the defendant Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
companies in the sum of $10,680 and trial was reserved against 
the individual defendants. (R. 24) Non-jury trial was held 
as to the liability of Lynn Dixon before the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks on the 19th day of April, 1978. At the time of trial, 
plaintiff abandoned its claim against George Perry and pursued 
its claim only against Lynn Dixon. Judgment was entered on 
the 15th day of May, 1978, in favor of the respondent and against 
the appellant, Lynn Dixon, in the sum of $10,400 plus interest. 
The appellant Lynn Dixon has appealed the iudgment of the trial 
court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's iudgment 
with a direction to enter judgment in favor of the appellant and 
against the respondent or in the alternative for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Royal Resources, Inc. filed suit against Gibralter 
Financial Corporation, Gibralter Securities Corporation, Lynn 
Dixon and George Perry. (R. 2) Lynn Dixon, the appellent, is 
the only remaining party among the original defendants in the case. 
Royal Resources in its amended complaint Para. 3 (R. 9) alleged 
that on April 11, 1975, Royal Resources executed and delivered 
to the defendant Gibralter Securities a check in the sum of $7,680. 
It was further alleged on April 16, 1975, that Royal Resources 
executed and delivered to Lynn Dixon, registered agent of defendant 
corporation, two checks, one for $6,800 and one for $3,200. This 
transaction was on April lS, 1975. The two checks which were 
delivered to Lynn Dixon were received as Exhibits 1-P and 2-P and 
provide for payment to the order of Lynn Dixon and were signed by Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Dee R. Woolley. The checks are drawn on the account of Royal 
Resources, Inc. Para. 4 of the amended complaint alleged that 
the sums were advanced and loaned pursuant to a previous and 
ongoing course of conduct. (R. 9) The complaint alleged that 
'there remained $10, 000 unpaid on the April 16, 1975, transactions 
involvinf, the two checks to Lynn Dixon plus a $400 unpaid fee and 
interest. Paragraph 7 of the amended complaint alleged that 
Dixon was liable individually in that he was acting as an agent 
for George Perry in his personal not corporate capacity. Para-
graph 8 of the complaint alleged that the defendants were jointly 
and individually liable for monies had and received. A stipulation 
was entered into between the appellant and respondent at the time 
of trial on April 19, 1978. The stipulation was to the effect 
that the transaction of April 16, 1975 was pursuant to a course 
of conduct over a period of time engaged in by brokers and especially 
the corporate defendant Gibralter Securities Corporation. (R. 84) 
The transaction involved a procedure in the securities trading 
business known as early settlement. (R. 57) The course of business 
involved a practice whereby when Gibralter Securities made a 
stock transaction involving the sale of stock, which would normally 
require a seven-day settlement period, that the respondent Royal 
Resources, Inc. would advance sums of money by way of early settlement 
so that the customer of Gibralter could realize his money before 
the seven-day period. The early payment was discounted for cash. 
In the subject transaction, funds were paid over by Royal Resources 
to Lynn Dixon as the payee on the checks. The checks were endorsed 
by Lynn Dixon personally with his Utah driver's license for 
identification. (R. 57) The checks indicate nothing further by 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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way of endorsement. Dee Woolley was the agent of the respondent 
Royal Resources, Inc. and conducted the transactions for Royal 
Resources. Royal Resources, Inc. had been brought to Gibralter 
to finance the "one-day pays" (R. 61) by Richard Mason who worked 
for Gibralter Securities as well as having a financial involvement 
with Royal Resources. (R. 61) Royal Resources paid Mason a 
finders fee. In effect, Royal Resources would provide cash on 
a discount basis to pay out a client of Gibralter Securities who 
could not wait for the seven-day period required by the Securit~s 
Exchange Cormnission. Gibralter, in turn, would pay over the funds 
at the end of the seven-day period to Royal Resources which would 
make a profit on the basis of the amount discounted at the time of 
making the one-day pay over to Gibralter's client. 
At the time of trial, Mr. Dee Woolley, the maker of the checks 
in question, testified that he had been an officer and director 
of Royal Resources, Inc. (R. 62) That the business of the respondent 
was the purchase of accounts receivable from brokerage customers 
of brokerage firms. (R. 64) Royal Resources would advance monies 
to the customer of the brokerage firm and in exchange they would 
receive an assignment from the customer of the proceeds of his 
sale of stock. (R. 64) Prior to any specific transaction Woolley 
would go to the bookkeeper of Gibralter Securities and determine 
whether a sale transaction had taken place. He would receive the 
monies due the brokerage company's customer at the end of the 
seven-day period. He would ascertain whether the customer of the 
brokerage firm had money coming by checking with Gibralter's 
accountant. (Tr. 65) This was done in all cases and in fact in 
the instant transaction he asked if a stock sale had been made 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and the stock sold and was advised that a sale had taken place. (Tr. 65) 
Mr. Woolley would receive a 47, fee by discounting the amount 
given to the customer by that percentage. (Tr. 66) 
The appellant Lynn Dixon was president of Gibralter Securities 
at the time of the transaction. (Tr. 75) He would handle the stock 
trades for his clients on behalf of Gibralter out of a personal 
trading account (Tr. 71) and would service some 2000 accounts in 
that fashion. (Tr. 71) Dixon testified that when a customer 
could not wait seven days for his money on a stock sale as required 
by the Securities Exchange Commission, Dee Woolley would advance 
early payment. (Tr. 72) Exhibits 1 and 2-P were identified as 
being part of an early payment transaction. (Tr. 68) A trade 
ticket would have been issued as part of the transaction (Tr. 68) 
although none could be found at the time of trial. The stock 
would be sold in the customer's account and the check obtained 
from Woolley cashed at Continental Bank and the money wired to 
ilie respective parties. (Tr. 67) Dixon testified that he negotiated 
the checks for a customer's account and wired the money to the 
customer possibly using his trading account for the transaction. 
(Tr. 70) Woolley would check and see if a trade had been made 
and would give a paper to Dixon that would be an assignment by 
the customer or person representing the customer. (R. 72) When 
the money would be received by Gibralter it, in turn, would be 
Paid over to Royal Resources. Dixon could not say why the money 
had not been paid over to Royal Resources (R. 74) and there were 
no records on the paid account. (Tr. 74, 75) Dixon had no 
control over the pay-over of money to Royal Resources. (R. 75-76) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Ms. Lois Crowder testified that she was the back office manager 
who kept the records of Gibralter Securities. (R. 76) Exhibit 
P-4 was received by stipulation which was a computer printout 
of the transfer of funds from Gibralter into Royal Resources. 
(R. 76) She indicated that Exhibit P-4 was kept differently 
than the customer ledgers at Gibralter Securities because Royal 
Resources was not actually a customer as far as stock transactions 
were concerned. (R. 77) She indicated that she would make a 
transfer to the Royal Resources account, Exhibit P-4, when a 
check was issued to Royal Resources and that the transaction 
involving the money paid to Mr. Dixon would not show on Exhibit 
P-4 for the reason that she never issued a check to Royal Resources. 
Before issuing a check, Mr. Woolley would give her a transfer and 
show her the copy of the trade ticket. She would check the stock 
account and receive the written assignment and based upon those 
documents issue a check to Royal Resources. (R. 78 ) Ms. Crowder 
testified that there had to have been a stock transaction and 
stock in the account but that she did not issue a check to Royal 
Resources because Royal Resources was considered a general creditor 
of Gibralter and not a customer and Gibralter Securities did not 
have the money to pay over to Royal Resources. She did not issue 
a check because the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) characterized Royal Resources as a general creditor. (R. 78,BC). 
She said that there was a stock transaction but since Royal 
Resources was not considered a customer but a general creditor 
. . s 
they had to be paid out of the general funds of Gibralter Secuntie 
and that Gibralter went broke. (R. 80,81). She stated the 
reason that Royal Resources was not paid the money due it on a Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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stock transaction was because the funds were held by Gibralter in 
a general account and when Gibralter went broke there were no 
funds to pay over to Royal Resources. (R. 83) 
A stipulation was entered into between counsel that on 
several occasions Mr. Dee Woolley went to Gibralter Securities 
and requested payment from the firm for the amounts in dispute 
and that at no time did he request payment from Mr. Dixon although 
Dixon was present on one occasion. (R. 84) 
Prior to trial, respondent moved for the production of all 
records and transactions between the defendants and plaintiffs during 
the period of January 1, 1975, through June 30, 1975. (R. 26) 
Thereafter, plaintiff sought a coercive order from the court to 
compel compliance with the motion to produce documents. (R. 35) 
In response Lynn Dixon filed an affidavit in which he indicated 
that he was not nor had he ever been the custodian of the records 
of Gibralter Financial Corporation or Gibralter Securities Corporation, 
and that he had none of the records in his possession. At the 
time of trial, the appellant Lyrtn Dixon testified that he was 
employed in an entirely new occupation and had no records concerning 
the transaction. (R. 66, 70) 
Based upon the above evidence, the trial court found that 
"the facts surrounding the transactions in this case in the absence 
J). of clarifying documents were peculiarly in the province and knowledge 
of" appellant Dixon. That the failure to produce documents raises 
apresumption that their contents are adverse to the defendants, 
(R. 46-47) and that because the checks were payable to Dixon 
(identified· as defendant in the Findings of Fact) that in the 
absence of documents or evidence to the contrary a conclusion 
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that the monies were had and received by Dixon was proper. This 
failure to produce documents shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendants and that they did not meet the burden. (R. 46-47) In 
the conclusions of law, the court found that "the failure to 
produce essential documents through discovery and at the trial [sic] 
is construed as a matter of law to determine the contents" adversely 
to the defendants and that Dixon was liable in the amount of 
$10,400. The inference against Dixon was apparently based on a 
failure to produce by all defendants. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE APPELLANT PERSONALLY 
LIABLE FOR FUNDS RECEIVED IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN AGENT. 
The trial court rendered judgment against Lynn Dixon in his 
individual capacity. It is submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court is erroneous in that the evidence clearly establishes that 
Lynn Dixon's receipt of monies from the respondent Royal Resources, 
Inc. was not in an individual capacity but in his capacity as an 
agent for Gibralter Securities and the clients of Gibralter Securities. 
Further, it is submitted that the facts clearly demonstrate that 
Dee Woolley of Royal Resources dealt with Lynn Dixon in a stock 
transaction for a one-day payout knowing that Dixon was an agent 
of Gibralter Securities and acting on behalf of a third person 
selling their stock. The very nature of the transaction envisioned 
a payment by Lynn Dixon over to the seller of stock in exchange 
for an assignment to Royal Resources of the seller's right to 
receive payment at the end of seven days. The only reason that 
Royal Resources did not receive payment was because they were 
considered a general creditor of Gibralter Securities, and when 
the latter corporation went broke, the funds that would have been 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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paid over to Royal Resources were no J.onger available. Dee 
Woolley appeared at Gibralter Securities at a time when Lynn Dixon 
was present and made demand upon Gibralter Securities for pa)'!Ilent. 
At no time did he make demand on Lynn Dixon personally. In the 
respondent's amended complaint, it is alleged .that the funds were 
paid over "pursuant to a previous and ongoing course of conduct." 
The allegation is that "the funds were loaned to the defendants" 
without identifying Lynn Dixon. With reference to the specific 
allegation as to Lynn Dixon's liability, Paragraph 7 of the 
respondent's amended complaint alleges ". . . Dixon is liable 
individually in that he was acting as an agent of George Perry 
in his personal not corporate capacity." Thus, it is clear 
from all of the evidence that Lynn Dixon was acting as an agent. 
The Restatement of Agency 2d, § 320 provides: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or 
purporting to make a contract with another as 
agent for a disclosed principal does not become 
a party to the contract." 
.es. A principal is disclosed according to Comment a of the Restatement 
of Agency 2d, § 320, when the other party has notice that the 
agent is acting for a principal and the principal' s identity. 
Comment a also provides: 
"One who purports to contract on behalf of a 
designated person does not manifest by this 
that he is making a contract on his own account, 
and only where he so manifests does the agent 
become a party to a contract which he makes 
for the principal. In the absence of other 
facts, the inference is that the parties have 
agreed that the principal is, and the agent 
is not, a party." 
Section 328 of the Restatement of Agency 2d adds: 
"An agent, by making a contract only on behalf 
of a competent disclosed or partially disclosed 
princinal whom he has power so to bind, does not 
thereby become liable for its nonperformance." 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Comment a to Section 328 of the Restatement of Agency 2d observes: 
"One who makes a contract only on account of 
another ordinarily does not himself contemplate 
responsibility for its performance. His function 
is performed if he causes a contract to be made 
between his principal and the third person. He 
uarantees neither the honest nor the solvenC-
t e principa . Emp asis a 
Generally, an agent is not responsible for money had and received 
where the money is paid over by the agent to his principal. 
3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency, §§ 301, 302. In 3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency, § 294, 
the general rule is stated: 
"If a contract is made with a known agent 
acting within the scope of his authority for 
a disclosed principal, the contract is that 
of the principal alone and the agent cannot 
be held liable thereon, unless credit has been 
given expressly and exclusively to the agent 
and it appears that it was clearly his inten-
tion to assume the obligation as a personal 
liability and that he has been informed that 
credit has been extended to him alone." 
Cases applying these principles have generally rejected claims 
of liability against persons such as the appellant who were 
acting simply as an agent for a third person. 
In Merit Motors v. Bartholomew, 179 Pa. Super. 576, 118 A.2d 
277 (1955), plaintiff, an automobile seller, brought action on the 
purchase price of an automobile against the buyer, and against 
Allstate Insurance Company on the theory that the insurance companv 
had agreed to finance the sale. In holding that plaintiff could 
not recover against Allstate, the court cited § 320 of the 
Restatement of Agency and stated: 
"It is well established that a person acting as 
an agent for a disclosed principal is not, in 
the absence of special circumstances, a party 
to the contract." 
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Asimilar result was reached holding the president of a corporation 
not liable on a corporate printing debt, Revere Press, Inc. v. 
~· 431 Pa. 370, 246 A.2d 407 (1968). 
A decision from the Wyoming Supreme Court is instructive in this 
case in view of the express allegation in respondent's complaint 
that Dixon acted as an agent. In reversing a judgment the court 
observed, Thomas v. Gonzelas, 79 Wyo. 111, 331 P.2d 832, 834 (1958): 
"The amended petition is ambiguous. It 
fails to state a clear cause of action against 
Emett Thomas. It is therein alleged that Emett 
Thomas acted as agent for the Cheevers in ordering 
electrical equipment, impliedly asserting that he 
did so within the scope of his authority. It is 
stated in 2 Restatement, Agency, § 328, ~- 724: 
'An agent, by making a contract only on behalf 
of a competent disclosed or partially disclosed 
principal whom he has power so to bind, does not 
thereby become liable for its nonperformance.' 
In the comment to that section it is said: 
'One who makes a contract only on 
account of another ordinarily does not 
himself contemplate responsibility for 
its performance. His function is per-
formed if he causes a contract to be made 
between his principal and the third 
person. * * *' 
In 3 C.J.S. Agency, § 215, p. 119, it is stated: 
'An agent who contracts on behalf of a 
disclosed principal and within the scope of 
his authroity, in the absence of an agreement 
otherwise, or other circumstances showing 
that he has expressly or impliedly incurred 
or intended to incur personal responsibility, 
is not personally liable to the other con-
tracting party * * *' 
There is no allegation in the second amended petition 
which discloses that the appellant Emett Thomas 
intended to bind himself personally." 
In Roller v. Smith, 88 N.M. 572, 544 P.2d 287 (1975), the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiff had no claim for 
relief against the defendant agent for the balance due on the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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sale of an automobile. The court stated: 
"[I]t is well established that an agent acting 
within his authority for a disclosed principal 
is not personally liable unless he was expressly 
made a party to the contract or unless he conducts 
himself in such a manner as to indicate an intent 
to be bound." 
From these cases and the facts of the instant case, it appears 
that as a matter of law, the trial court erred in imposing 
liability against Lynn Dixon. Dixon was acknowledged as a 
"registered agent" for defendant corporation in plaintiff's 
amended complaint. (R. 9) It was stipulated that demand was 
made by plaintiff for payment from Gibralter Securities and 
not Dixon. Dee Woolley who made out the checks payable from 
respondent to Lynn Dixon acknowledged that it was his practice 
to determine from Gibralter Securities if a stock sale had been 
made before making the one-day loan and that he did so as regards 
the instant transaction. (R. 65) Mr. Woolley's dealings were 
part of a course of dealing with Gibralter Securities and he 
would take an assignment of the client's right to payment. (R. 
66) The appellant gave over the money to the stock seller, and 
his trader's account was simply a vehicle to service Gibralter 
Securities clients. In accord with practice when Gibralter 
received the money from the stock sale, it would be paid over to 
Royal Resources. Dixon had no control over the pay over to Royal 
Resources. Before a payover would be made, Dee Woolley would 
present Lois Crowder of Gibralter Securities with a transfer and 
trade ticket. The reason payment was not made by Gibralter in the 
instant situation was because Gibralter did not have the money to 
pay off its general creditors. These facts clearly show no 
liability on the part of Dixon since he was merely an agent. 
This court should reverse with directions for a judgment for appellant. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DRAWING AN EVIDENTIARY CONCLUSION 
FROM THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS WHERE THE DOCUMENTS 
WERE NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE APPELLANT AND WERE AS 
EQUALLY ACCESSIBLE TO THE RESPONDENT AS THE APPELLANT 
IF THEY WERE IN FACT IN EXISTENCE. 
Prior to trial, respondent moved for production of all records 
and transactions between plaintiff and defendants during the period 
from January 1, 1975 through June 30, 1975. The production request 
was addressed generally to the "defendants." In response to the 
motion, the appellant filed an affidavit in which he indicated 
that he was not nor had he been the custodian of the records of 
i G~ralter Financial Corporation or Gibralter Securities Corporation 
and that he had none of the records in his possession. At the 
.ant. 
time of trial, the appellant testified that he was employed in 
anew occupation and had no records concerning the transaction. 
In paragraph 6 of the appellant's affidavit, he stated: 
"Affiant continues to stand ready to give 
testimony, depositions, and affidavits on 
behalf of Plaintiff but cannot produce 
documents that have not been in his care 
and custody or his possession from the 
closing of Gibralter Securities Corp." 
Further, based upon the testimony of Lois Crowder, the critical 
records dealing with the respondent's right to payment would be 
the assignment and the trade ticket and the records of the 
transaction would be in the individual customers account. Thus, 
some of the critical records would be in the possession of Royal 
Resources, Inc. Even so, the trial court found that the facts 
surrounding the transaction in the case were peculiarly within 
the province of the appellant Dixon. Based on this finding, the 
court concluded that the failure to produce the documents raised 
a presumption that their contents were adverse to the defendants Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and that the burden of proof was shifted to Dixon concerning the 
transaction. It is submitted that this constituted a misapplica-
tion of the evidentiary law justifying this court reversing and 
granting a new trial. In 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 156(b) it is 
stated: 
"The unexplained failure or refusal 
of a party to judicial proceedings to 
produce relevant and competent documentary 
evidence or an article which would tend to 
throw light on the issues authorizes, under 
certain circumstances, an inference or a 
presumption unfavorable to such party. 
Possession or control of such evidence by 
the party against whom the inference or 
presumption is sought to be invoked, is 
necessary; the rule does not apply where 
the evidence is equally available to both 
parties. Further, it must appear that 
there has been an actual suppression or 
withholding of the evidence; no unfavorable 
inference arises where the circumstances 
indicate that the document or article in 
question has been lost or accidentally 
destroyed, or where the failure to produce 
it is otherwise properly accounted for." 
See inferentially, Mcintyre v. The Ajax Mining Co., 17 Utah 213, 
53 Pac. 1124 (1898). See also, 29 Am.Jur. 2d Evidence § 178. 
It is well settled that before any adverse inference can be drawn 
from the non-production of evidence that the evidence in question 
must be identified and must be peculiarly within the power of 
one party to produce. In the instant case, Dixon had no access 
to the records of Gibralter Securities nor was there any showing 
of any documentation actually in existence which would have 
clarified the matter which was within the power of Dixon to 
produce. Indeed, the records of Gibralter Securities were as 
accessible to respondent as they were to Dixon. Further, 
respondent had access to particular documents such as trade 
tickets and assignments which also would have had a direct 
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bearing upon the issue. In Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed. § 3.93, 
it is stated: 
"No unfavorable inference arises from a 
failure to produce evidence which is not 
within the control of the party who has 
failed to produce it, . . . " 
It is therefore submitted that under the facts before the trial 
court, there was no basis to draw an unfavorable inference or 
presumption with reference to any claimed failure of the appellant 
to produce documents relating to the transaction in question. 
Even so, it is submitted that such a negative inference cannot 
shift the burden of proof nor affirmatively establish the plaintiff's 
case. In 31 C.J.S. Evidence§ 156, it is stated: 
"Inferences from the suppression of documents 
or failure to produce them on notice increase 
the weight of evidence produced by the other 
party as to the contents of the documents, or 
as to the facts to which the documents are 
relevent, but do not constitute independent 
evidence of a fact." 
29 C.J.S. Am.Jur. 2d § 177 states the rule: 
"While the spoliation of evidence may raise a 
presumption or inference against the party guilty 
of such act, it does not relieve the other party 
from introducing evidence tending affirmatively 
to prove his case, insofar as he has the 
burden of proof. This presumption or 
inference does not amount to substantive 
proof and cannot take the place of proof 
of a fact necessary to the other party's 
cause." 
~e also, 1 Jones on Evidence, § 3.93, p. 329. In National Life 
~d Accident Insurance Co. v. Eddings, 188 Tenn. 512, 221 S.W.2d 
695 (1949), Eddings sued the defendant insurance company to 
recover on an industrial insurance policy. The company defended 
on the grounds that plaintiff had not been in sound health at the 
time the policy was taken out. On appeal, the issue before the 
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Tennessee Court was how far the inference arising from a party's 
failure to produce evidence may supply evidence against such 
person. The plaintiff Eddings had refused to consent to the 
taking of depositions of his treating physicians who had provided 
treatment for him immediately prior to the time he took out a 
policy with the defendant. The insurance company contended 
that in addition to the unfavorable inference from the failure to 
produce such evidence which was peculiarly within the plaintiff's 
control, that such inference was sufficient to establish the facts 
of the defense of the defendant insurance company. The Tennessee 
Court indicated that such evidence "does not amount to substantive 
proof which can be substituted for a fact required to make out 
his adversaries case >'< '~ ·t< it cannot be treated as affirmative 
evidence of a fact otherwise unproved." The court also indicated 
that the presumption or inference from the non-production of 
evidence is not sufficient to supply independent evidence of a 
fact unproved by other evidence. The court stated the rule: 
"Thus, the failure to produce books and papers 
which have been called for does not raise the 
inference that, if produced, they would establish 
the facts which it is alleged they would prove. 
The only inference that may be drawn is that the 
testimony if given would not have been favorable 
to the party who did not produce the evidence. 
Evidence of such conduct is persuasive rather 
than probative and cannot be invoked as sub-
stantive proof of any facts essential to the 
case of the opponent. The rule has been stated 
that the presumption will not supply a missing 
link in an adversary's case and cannot be treated 
as independent evidence of a fact otherwise 
unproved. It has been stated that the presumption 
arising from the nonproduction of evidence does 
not relieve the other party from the burden of 
proving his case." 
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In the instant case, the effect of the ruling of the trial court 
was to relieve Royal Resources of the normal plaintiff's burden 
of proving its claim for relief and to substitute a negative 
inference as substantive proof. This is contrary to the accepted 
rule with reference to the use of inferences from the non--production 
of evidence. The rule with reference to non-production of evidence 
is a mere inference not a true presumption, Presumptions in Utah: 
A Search for Certainty, 5 Utah L.Rev. 196 (1956); Wigmore, Evidence, 
3d Ed. § 2424, § 291, p. 182; Utah Rules of Evidence 13 and 14. 
As the New Hampshire court recognized in Stocker v. Boston and 
Maine Railroad, 84 N.H. 377, 151 A. 457, 459 (1930), it">'<** is 
no more than saying that proof must rest upon evidence and not 
upon its absence." The burden of proof does not shift under 
these circumstances, Rule 1 (4) Utah Rules of Evidence. In Koes ling 
v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975), this Court observed: 
"The burden of persuasion does not shift, 
however, and remains upon the party asserting 
the proposition. Thus, where, as here, the 
proponent has the burden of persuading the 
trier of fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that is, that the asserted proposi-
tion is more likely than not, he carries that 
burden throughout the trial. Having adduced 
sufficient evidence to show or tending to 
show the existence of the proposition, and 
having thus met his burden of production, he 
nevertheless suffers the risk of nonpersuasion 
or disbelief. 
It is submitted this court should reverse and grant a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE RESPONDENT WAS PRECLUDED FROM HAVING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE APPELLANT WHEN IT PREVIOUSLY TOOK 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE TWO CORPORATE DEFENDANTS. 
The plaintiff below, Royal Resources, Inc., in its amended 
complaint named Gibralter Financial Corporation, Gibralter Securities 
Corporation, Lynn Dixon and George Perry as defendants. (R. 9) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-B-
George Perry was released from the action at trial. The amended 
complaint listed Lynn Dixon as registered agent of defendant 
corporation, listed the monies paid over as short-term loans to 
defendants and indicated that the defendants were jointly liable. 
(R. 9, 10, etc.) On the 22nd of July, 1977, while the action was 
still pending against the appellant Dixon, Royal Resources took 
judgment against both corporate defendants for the same aMount 
and on the same causes of action as was eventually involved in the 
judgment against the appellant Dixon. In that judgment, it was 
expressly indicated that Dixon and Perry would agree to fully 
cooperate with plaintiffs in seeking redress from a Federal a~ency, 
SCIPIC (Securities Investor Protection Corporation) for the 
purposes of obtaining federal insurance compensation for the 
loss. (R. 24) In his affidavit of March 6, 1978, Dixon indicated 
a further willingness to assist Royal Resources in the satisfaction 
of its judgment by recovery against SCIPIC. Thereafter, the 
respondent continued to pursue its action against Dixon. 
It is submitted that respondent cannot have judgment against 
Gibralter Securities Corporation, Gibralter Financial Corporation 
and the appellant Dixon. The Restatement of Contracts § 119(1) 
provides: 
"A judgment rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction within the United States against 
one or more joint promisors, or against one or 
more joint and several promisors, upon a joint 
promise, discharges the joint duty of the other 
joint promisors." 
This rule is applicable to actions against a principal and an 
agent. Restatement of Agency 2d, § 336b. See also Corrnnent e. 
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rnJAm.Jur. 2d Agency,§ 309, it is stated: 
"[T]he rule followed almost universally is 
that if the third party, after learning the 
facts and the identity of the principal, 
brings suit and recovers judgment against the 
agent, this is an election against the agent 
which will bar a subsequent action against 
the principal, regardless of whether the 
judgment is or is not satisfied. A judgment 
against the principal will likewise have the 
effect of barring a subsequent action by the 
third person against the agent." 
In the instant case, it is submitted that judgment cannot be 
had against the corporate defendants and their agent Dixon for the 
same indebtedness. If Dixon was a fully disclosed agent of Gibralter 
Securities, judgment may not be had against him as only the principal 
is liable. If Dixon were deemed an agent for a partially disclosed 
or undisclosed principal, judgment may not be had against both 
the agent and the principal. Rather, the plaintiff must make 
an election. In Costello v. Kasteler, 7 Utah 2d 310, 324 P.2d 772 
(1958), this Court recognized the rule before referenced and 
indicated that prior Utah authority, Love v. St. Joseph Stock Yards 
~. 51 Utah 305, 169 Pac. 951 (1917), supported the same conclusion. 
fu the Costello case, this court stated: 
"Appellants further contend that the court 
erred in granting judgment against both of them 
since the court found that at the time of the 
negotiations for the services appellant Kasteler 
did not disclose to respondent that he was acting 
as the agent for the appellant Uranium Chemical 
Corporation and the law is well settled that where 
a contract is entered into with the agent of an 
undisclosed principal for the use and benefit 
of the principal an election must be made as to 
whether the agent or the principal will be held 
liable, but a judgment cannot be obtained against 
both. As authority appellant cites Love v. St. 
Joseph Stock Yards Co., 51 Utah 305, 169 P. 951. 
That case does contain a dictum to that effect 
and respondent concedes that the majority rule 
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after discovery of an undisclosed principal a 
judgment cannot ordinarily be obtained against 
both the principal and the agent. As stated 
in 118 A.L.R., page 704, note 111: 
'It has generally been held that 
where the agent and undisclosed principal 
are joined, the plaintiff may not have 
judgment against both, but must, prior 
to jud~ent, elect to hold one or the 
other. 
Ordinarily plaintiff would not be entitled to 
judgment against both." 
In the case the Court went on to note that a failure to demand an 
election might constitute a waiver. However, the Court indicated 
that an election could be made on remand. It is submitted, however, 
that in the instant case respondent has in fact made an election. 
Respondent saw fit to take judgment first against Gibralter 
Securities and to enlist the aid of the appellant Dixon in 
satisfying the judgment through a claim against SCIPIC. This 
conduct certainly was in the nature of an election and precludes 
a judgment from being entered against the appellant Dixon. 
Restatement of Agency 2d, § 210a. It is therefore submitted 
that this Court should reverse with instructions to enter judgment 
in favor of the appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case clearly establishes that the 
appellant Lynn Dixon acted as an agent for Gibralter Securities. 
The testimony of respondent's officer Dee Woolley, the principal 
party acting for respondent in the transaction in question and the 
testimony of all other persons shows appellant received no personal 
gain from monies had and received from respondent. The monies 
were received as an agent and respondent was entitled to compensation 
on a stock transaction from Dixon's principal Gibralter Securities. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Under these circumstances, no judgment of individual liability was 
properly rendered against Dixon and appellant submits that the 
case should be reversed with directions to enter judgment in 
favor of Dixon. Appellant further submits that the trial court 
misapplied an evidentiary standard in determining that negative 
inferences could be drawn against appellant from the failure to 
produce documents where the documents were not shown to be in 
existence or subject to production by appellant Lynn Dixon. 
Further, even if an evidentiary inference could have been drawn, 
the trial court acted improperly in suggesting that it shift the 
burden of proof and in effect provide substantive evidence in 
support of the respondent's case. Finally, it is submitted that 
respondent could not have judgment against both the principals 
and agent in this case and having taken judgment first against 
the principal and thereafter seeking the agent's aid in the 
satisfaction of that judgment is precluded in having judgment 
against the agent Lynn Dixon. It is therefore submitted this 
Court should reverse. 
-~ Respectfully ~b~itted~ I) r- ~ 
=-· r<~-:; 
/ ~~J. Leedy . 
610 E t South Temple--
Salt ke City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant Lynn Dixon 
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